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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. : 
CASEY CRAIG WEAVER, : 
Appellate Court No. 200701A1 -C A 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Possession with 
Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a second-degree felony in violation 
of U.C.A. §58-37-8. Judgment, Sentence and Commitment of the Second 
District Court for Weber County, was entered on October 13, 2006. This Court 
has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
WERE THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES VIOLATED 
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a mixed question of fact and law. The trial 
court's legal conclusions should be reviewed for correctness, according no 
deference to the trial court's conclusion. The trial court's findings of fact should 
be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. "[Q]uestions of law 
are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed 
only if clearly erroneous." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). This 
issued was preserved for appeal when the Defendant entered a conditional plea 
of guilty pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). (R. 
070/2-4). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§58-37-8. Possession of a Controlled Substance/Prohibited acts - Penalties 
See Addendum A. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged with one count of Possession with Intent to 
Distribute a Controlled Substance, a second-degree felony. The Defendant 
entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to State v. Seiy, 758 P.2d 935, 939 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) preserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress. The Defendant was sentenced on October 13, 2006, to serve 
an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. On 
February 6, 2007, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. The Defendant is 
currently serving the sentence at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The suppression motion was brought to the courts attention by the 
Defendant's filing of a motion and memorandum. The State responded to that 
motion with a memorandum of its own. Apparently the parties agreed that the 
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facts as set forth in the stipulations would be sufficient for purposes of the 
motion. There was no evidentiary hearing held regarding additional facts 
concerning the motion. The statement of facts is therefore a compilation of the 
statements of facts as set forth by the parties in their respective memoranda. (A 
copy of both motions is attached as an addendum to this brief) 
On September 3, 2005, Officer Trent Olsen was patrolling the area of 
3700 S. Orchard, Ogden, Utah. Officer Olsen noticed a White Nissan going 
northbound on Orchard. Officer Olsen ran a plate check on the vehicle and 
found that the vehicle's registration was revoked and the owner had no 
insurance. A traffic stop was initiated. Officer Olsen stated that as the stop was 
being made, he noticed the male driver make a motion dipping his right shoulder 
as if he was trying to place something under his seat. 
Contact was made with the driver, the Defendant in this case, and Officer 
Olsen was handed a driver's license that identified the Defendant as Casey 
Weaver. The Defendant informed Officer Olsen that the vehicle was not his and 
that he did not have any information regarding the vehicle's registration or 
insurance. Officer Olsen proceeded to run the Defendant's information and the 
information on the vehicle. No warrants were found for the Defendant, and the 
vehicle was shown to be registered to Tammy Cassel. At that same time, Officer 
Bailey arrived and was asked by Officer Olsen to find out the name of the 
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female passenger. The female passenger of the vehicle proceeded to give a false 
name to Officer Bailey. She was subsequently arrested for giving false personal 
information and for outstanding warrants. 
Despite the Defendants continued attempts to have Officer Olsen contact 
the registered owner of the vehicle, Officer Olsen refused to do so and decided 
to have the vehicle impounded. At that time, the Defendant was told to step out 
of the vehicle. Officer Bailey asked for consent to search the person of the 
Defendant. Consent was given, and nothing was found on the Defendant. Officer 
Olsen then began an inventory search of the vehicle. At no time up to this point 
was the Defendant told he was under arrest. 
As the inventory search of the vehicle continued, Officer Olsen located in 
the back seat of the vehicle a black backpack. Officer Olsen opened the 
backpack, and in the front pocket located a sunglass case, opened it, and noticed 
about ten small baggies, of which two contained a large amount of 
methamphetamine. Also in the backpack, Officer Olsen found syringes and 
other individual clear baggies. At this time the Defendant was advised he was 
under arrest, and Officer Olsen arrested the Defendant for possession of a 
controlled substance. After the arrest, Officer Olsen then continued to inventory 
the backpack and found an insurance application with the name of "Casey 
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Weaver" on it, a credit card receipt, and a ticket out of Sunset Court with the 
name of "Casey Weaver." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case revolves around the seminal question of whether or not the 
Defendant's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution were violated. In this case the Defendant was borrowing a 
car that happened to be unregistered and uninsured. An Officer stopped the 
vehicle, found the Defendant free of any warrant or other offense, and proceeded 
to search the Defendant's backpack, which contained illegal drugs and 
paraphernalia. The officer did not have reasonable suspicion or evidence that 
Defendant had committed any type of crime; and, therefore, according to 
established case law the search was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. Any evidence obtained through the illegal 
search of the Defendant's backpack constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree and 
should be suppressed as evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WERE 
VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
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The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides 
in relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated." The Courts on both the state and federal level have defined when a 
seizure is unreasonable. 
The Supreme Court in the case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967) held: 
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See 
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 
274 U. S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected. 
The general rule regarding warrantless searches was established in the 
case of Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) in which the Supreme Court set forth a 
three-prong test in determining whether an individual is seized and what type of 
search is permitted under various types of seizures. 
In the recent case of State v. Hansen 2002 UT 463 % 34 63 P.3d 650, the 
Utah Supreme Court defined once again its' long-standing position on 
permissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, the Court defined these levels as 
follows: 
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A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a 
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to 
non-coercive questioning by an officer. Id. Since the encounter is 
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is 
no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Royer, 
460 U.S. at 498-99 
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is 
usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive. United States v. 
Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Werking, 
915 F.2d at 1407 (noting a level two encounter is an investigative 
detention or "Terry stop"). Although it is a Fourth Amendment 
seizure, probable cause is not required. Evans, 937 F.2d at 1537. 
Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and rational 
inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or 
is committing a crime," an officer may initiate an investigative 
detention without consent. Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407. 
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been 
"characterized [as a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] 
requires probable cause." Id. A level three encounter is also a 
Fourth Amendment seizure. Id. 
In State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 643 63 P.3d 650, the Utah Supreme Court 
was presented with a set of facts similar to the case at hand. In that case the 
defendant was legally stopped for an initial traffic offense. After the officer had 
verified his license and registration, the officer asked the defendant if he could 
search the vehicle for alcohol, drugs, or weapons. The defendant allowed the 
search and then appealed that search to the Utah Supreme Court. The court 
stated: 
In this case, after Officer Huntington verified Hansen's license 
and registration and completed a computer check, the purpose for 
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the initial traffic stop was concluded. Yet, Officer Huntington 
extended the encounter by questioning Hansen about whether he 
had alcohol, drugs, or weapons in his vehicle and by asking if he 
could search his vehicle for these items. Officer Huntington 
conceded he had no reasonable suspicion of a further illegality to 
justify the additional questioning. Rather, he engaged in such 
questioning as a matter of practice. Since the scope of 
questioning exceeded, without justification, the purpose of the 
initial traffic stop, the continued encounter was illegal unless 
some other circumstance justified the additional questioning. (Id. 
atf 32) 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals reversal of the 
defendant's conviction on the grounds that the defendant's consent to search 
"resulted from exploitation of the prior police illegality." (Id. at f^ 70) The 
Court ruled that a defendant's consent to search that is a direct result of an 
illegal detention violates the defendant's Fourth Amendment constitutional 
rights. 
Similarly, in the case at bar, the officer ran a records check and found that 
that the unregistered vehicle did not belong to the Defendant and that the 
Defendant had committed no other offense. At that point, when the officer 
continued to perform an inventory search, he was violating the Defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights by not asking the Defendant if anything in the vehicle 
belonged to the Defendant and by not allowing him to remove his private 
property prior to the inventory search. Because the officer failed to take the 
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proper steps, the evidence found "resulted from exploitation of the prior police 
illegality" and should have been suppressed. Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in the case of State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT 
App. 434, 37 P.3d 260, reversed a defendant's conviction where he was stopped 
in a public bank based upon a tip from an unknown informant that the defendant 
had committed a forgery. The defendant was arrested and a search revealed a 
controlled substance. This Court determined that a reasonable officer under the 
circumstances could not have had reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
defendant had committed an offense; therefore, the seizure was unconstitutional. 
Likewise in the case at bar, the officer had no reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the Defendant had committed an offense aside from a traffic 
violation. It can be argued that the officer had reasonable grounds to impound 
the vehicle and conduct an inventory search; however, the Defendant's personal 
property should have been excluded from a proper inventory search. 
In the case of State v. Valdez 2003 UT App 470 68 P.3d 1052, this Court 
was presented with a case where the police officers were executing an arrest 
warrant on an individual. That individual requested that the officers allow her to 
go into her bedroom to put on some weather appropriate clothing. The officers 
accompanied the individual into her bedroom, at which point they discovered a 
male individual (the defendant) lying on the bed with his hands obscured from 
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the officers view. The officers, in an attempt to insure their safety, woke the 
individual, discovered that he had nothing in his hand, and yet proceeded to 
request his identification. The defendant originally told the officers that he did 
not have any identification; and then, when asked, proceeded to give the officers 
a false name. Upon discovering that the false name had been given, the officers 
arrested the defendant; and in a search incident to arrest, discovered 
methamphetamine. The trial court suppressed all the evidence, and the Utah 
Court of Appeals affirmed that suppression with a holding as follows: 
The trial court found, and we are not presented with a factual 
basis to disturb its finding, that nothing supported the officers' 
investigation into Valdez's identity during the detention. The trial 
court further found that no articulable facts existed to support a 
reasonable suspicion that Valdez was involved in any criminal 
activity. Therefore, Robinson's request for Valdez's 
identification, or, absent that, information concerning his identity, 
exceeded the scope of the reason justifying the initial detention 
and unnecessarily expanded its duration and scope. Thus, we 
conclude that the trial court correctly suppressed any evidence 
gathered from that point forward. (Id, at f 21) 
In the case at bar, there is no question that the officer had a right pull over 
the vehicle which the Defendant was driving after the officer ran the license 
plates and discovered no registration or insurance. A questionable occurrence 
occurs thereafter, however. Once it determined the identity of the Defendant, 
that he did not own the vehicle, and that there were no active warrants for his 
arrest, the Defendant should have been free to leave with his belongings. 
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The seminal issue in this case is whether or not Officer Olsen had 
determined to arrest the defendant for the charges of no registration or driving 
without insurance. The record is devoid of any indication that Officer Olsen, 
prior to the inventory search, had either made a determination to arrest the 
Defendant or had informed the Defendant of this intention. It appears from all 
of the evidence that the Defendant was going to be cited for these two 
misdemeanor violations, allowed to leave, and the vehicle was going to be 
impounded. Furthermore, there is no physical indicia of an arrest. In the case at 
bar, the Defendant was not informed that he was under arrest, he was not placed 
in handcuffs or otherwise restrained, he was not placed in the officer's vehicle, 
but was merely allowed to stand by the side of the road while the officer 
conducted the inventory search. Given the fact that the officer already knew 
that the Defendant was not the owner of the vehicle, he should have then 
informed the Defendant of his intention to impound the vehicle and allowed the 
Defendant to remove any personal items there from. Once that act had occurred, 
the officer could then perform the inventory search according to protocol. 
The State argues that inventory searches are a well-recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Hygh, 711 
P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). However, the State fails to recognize the Defendant's 
legitimate expectation of privacy of personal belongings in inventory searches 
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when the Defendant in not placed under arrest. State v. Bissegger, 2003 Ut. App. 
256at^j9 76P.3dl78. 
The Court of Appeals has held that "car passengers have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in their belongings left in a vehicle." State v. Bissegger, 
2003 Ut. App. 256 at \ 9 76 P.3d 178 (overturned for another point of law). In 
Bissegger, the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped because 
of expired registration. During the conversation with the driver, the officer 
asked the driver to exit the vehicle due to his belief that driver was impaired 
with alcohol. The officer then asked the driver for consent to search the vehicle, 
which was given, and asked the passenger, Bissegger, to exit the vehicle. 
Bissegger left behind some of her belongings, including a small lip-balm 
container. During the search the officer searched the lip-balm container and 
found methamphetamine inside the container. Bissegger moved to suppress the 
evidence. 
The Bissegger Court held that the defendant had a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in her lip-balm container that was left in the car. In addition, the 
Court said the expectation to privacy extends beyond a closed-container of lip-
balm and applies to a shopping bag, purse, shoulder bag, or jacket. Id at \ 12. 
And as such, Bissegger had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. Id. 
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The same analysis also applies to this case. The vehicle was not the 
Defendant's vehicle; he had been loaned the vehicle by its owner and did not 
know the registration and insurance status of the vehicle. Once the officer 
recognized this and found no warrant for the Defendant, the officer did not have 
authority to perform a search of Defendant's personal belongings located in the 
vehicle without violating the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. In 
addition, the Defendant never relinquished a "legitimate expectation of privacy" 
to the container/backpack in the vehicle after he was ordered out of the vehicle; 
and the Defendant was never asked if anything in the vehicle belonged to him 
prior to the officer's inventory search. The officer had the right to impound the 
vehicle and perform an inventory search, but failed to take the proper step of 
asking whether any belongings in the car were the Defendant's. The Defendant 
had a reasonable, legitimate expectation of privacy of his backpack, and any 
evidence found through the officer's unlawful search should be suppressed as 
evidence. 
Furthermore, the State argues that the drugs would have been discovered 
pursuant to a search incident to arrest of the passenger after she gave a false 
name to the officers. The State cites United States v. Lars en
 9 111 F.3d 984 (10th 
Cir. 1997) which held, "whenever an independent investigation inevitably 
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would have led to discovery of the evidence, whether or not the investigation 
was ongoing at the time of the illegal police conduct." Id. 
The State misapplies this case when they assume that the backpack could 
have been searched during a search incident to arrest of the passenger. The 
Courts have held that the detention and search cannot exceed the scope of the 
initial detention. State v. Valdez 2003 UT App 470 68 P.3d 1052, see also State 
v. Hansen, 2002 UT 643 63 P.3d 650. Here it is clear that the officer knew that 
the unregistered vehicle did not belong to the Defendant; and it is clear that the 
officer knew that there was no warrant on the Defendant; and it is clear that the 
officer had no reason to arrest the Defendant. At this point, the officer should 
have asked the Defendant if he has any personal belongings in the car prior to 
performing a search incident to arrest of the passenger. The failure to do so 
exceeds the scope of the initial detention of the Defendant, and any evidence 
found against the Defendant would have been obtained illegally and should be 
suppressed. 
The reasonableness of the initial stop is not challenged, and our focus is 
on the second prong of the Terry inquiry: whether the officer's actions during 
the detention were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying 
the interference in the first place. It is clearly established under the second part 
of Terry that an investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer 
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than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the 
detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, (1983) (emphasis added) 
Instead, Officer Olsen forced the Defendant to wait outside the vehicle 
while he proceeded to search the vehicle. It is clear that Officer Olsen did not 
meet the level-two requirements of "specific and articulable facts" to search the 
backpack, provided in Hansen. {State v. Hansen 2002 UT 463 % 34 63 P.3d 650) 
Furthermore, Officer Olsen did not ask who the owner of the backpack 
was; he simply began to search the vehicle while making the Defendant wait. 
The Defendant was never asked if any of the belongings were his nor did he 
give his permission to search any articles in the vehicle. Officer Olsen should 
have asked if the Defendant had any personal items in the vehicle prior to his 
search. It was clear to Officer Olsen that the vehicle did not belong to the 
Defendant, and certain items in the vehicle may not have belonged to him. In 
addition, the Defendant was never placed under arrest; therefore, any search of 
the backpack incident to arrest must fail. 
Taken as a whole, the totality of the above-stated information could not 
possibly constitute reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was committing or 
was about to commit a crime. The fact that the officer thereafter detained the 
Defendant violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. 
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Pursuant to state and federal case law, anything searched thereafter would be in 
violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights against unreasonable search 
and seizure. Once that line was crossed, no quantum of evidence can thereafter 
retroactively cure this violation. 
Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally 
impermissible seizure of the Defendant, the next issue is to what extent does this 
constitutional violation affect the subsequent evidence. In the case of Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "The 
exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials 
obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion." The Court 
further reinforced the gravity of Fourth Amendment protections by stating, 
In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional 
guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person, 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, this Court held nearly half a 
century ago that evidence seized during an unlawful search could 
not constitute proof against the victim of the search. Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383. The exclusionary prohibition 
extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such 
invasions. (Wong Sun v. United States, at 484) 
The Utah Appellate Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine. In the case of State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 
(Utah App. 1998), this Court held: 
Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, Mapp requires us to 
exclude "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in 
violation of the Constitution." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 
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1691. There is no dispute that the stop of defendant at the Tibbie 
Fork Canyon traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional. Nor is there 
any dispute that, absent the good faith exception, all evidence 
obtained subsequent to defendant's stop should be suppressed as 
"fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. 
S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
In the case at bar, there is no question that the officer impermissibly 
seized the Defendant when the officer ordered the Defendant out of the vehicle 
and made the Defendant wait while the officer searched the vehicle. Once that 
seizure occurred, any evidence obtained should be suppressed as a violation of 
the Defendant's constitutional rights under the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine. In the present case, that suppression should include all evidence 
concerning the Defendant's possession of illegal drugs and paraphernalia. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing the trial court erred in failing to recognize the 
obvious violation of the Defendant's Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. 
This failure resulted in the admission of evidence that should have been 
suppressed. The Defendant therefore respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the Defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial without the evidence that 
should have been suppressed. 
DATED this 12th day of June 20071 
RANDALL WARICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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58-37-8, Possession of a Controlled Substance Prohibited acts — 
Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; 
or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results 
in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 
37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations 
of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are 
undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of 
management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance 
analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a 
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty 
of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of 
a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty 
of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in 
Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term 
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of 
not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained 
under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting 
in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this 
chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and 
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those 
locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance 
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin 
from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less 
than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) 
subsequent to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be 
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection 
(2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty 
of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled 
substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of 
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in 
his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent 
manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the 
death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those 
described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under 
Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in 
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to 
assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, 
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any 
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to 
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation 
or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance 
from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false 
name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or 
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or 
other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any 
of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any 
drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful 
under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or 
under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon 
conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection 
(4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or 
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-
10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of 
where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, 
delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an 
inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 
76-8-3113. 
(b) (i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if 
the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and 
the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would 
have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person 
convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does 
not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person 
convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person 
who, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, 
directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection 
(4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the 
time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the 
actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as 
described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act 
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a 
class B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, 
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized 
by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another 
state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, 
distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie 
evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character 
of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from 
prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from 
causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under 
his direction and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, 
distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a 
placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the 
ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope 
of his employment. 
(10) (a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section 
on any Indian, as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1 )(v), who uses, possesses, 
or transports peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in 
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in 
Subsection 58-37-2(1 )(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as 
defined in Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that 
the peyote was used, possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide 
traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a 
traditional Indian religion. 
(c) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an 
affmnative defense under this Subsection (10) as soon as practicable, but not 
later than ten days prior to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice 
for good cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack 
of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this 
Subsection (10) by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is 
established, it is a complete defense to the charges. 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051904357 FS 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
Date: October 12, 2006 
PRESENT. 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: HEWARD, GARY R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL BOUWHUIS, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 10, 1976 
Video 
Tape Number: BIO1206 Tape Count: 9:45-9:4! 
CHARGES 
1, POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST (amended) - 2nd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/31/2006 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present in custody 
and is represented by Michael Bouwhuis, public defender. Court 
proceeds with sentencing. 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
CD19264444 
051904357 WEAVER,CASEY CRAIG 
Page 1 
Case No: 051904357 
Date: Oct 12, 2006 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/INTENT TO DIST 
CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded zo your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends credit for the time served in the Weber County 
Jail and does not oppose allowing the defendant the option of Drug 
Board. 
Dated this _^ day of (,c a 
PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 
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Ryan J. Bushell, #8843 of 
Weber County Public Defender's Association 
Attorney for Defendant 
2562 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)392-8247 
FN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CASEY CRAIG WEAVER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 051904357 
Judge Baldwin 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, above-named, by and through his attorney, Ryan J. 
Bushell, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about September 3, 2005, Officer Trent Olsen was patrolling the area of 3700 S. 
Orchard. Officer Olsen noticed a White Nissan going northbound on Orchard. Officer Olsen ran 
a plate check on the vehicle and found that the vehicle's registration was revoked and the owner 
had no insurance. A traffic stop was initiated. Officer Olsen states that as the stop was being 
made, he noticed the male driver make a motion dipping his right shoulder as if he was trying to 
place something under his seat. 
Contact was made with the driver, the Defendant in this case, and Officer Olsen was 
handed a drivers license that identified the Defendant as Casey Weaver. The Defendant 
informed Officer Olsen that the vehicle was not his and that he did not have any information 
S E C O N D D . K T S j r r rrM*r>~ 
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regarding the vehicle's registration or insurance. Officer Olsen proceeded to run the Defendant's 
information and the information on the vehicle. No warrants were found for the Defendant, and 
the vehicle showed to be registered to Tammy Cassel. At that same time, Officer Bailey arrived 
and was asked by Officer Olsen to find out the name of the female passenger. The female 
passenger of the vehicle proceed to give a false name to Officer Bailey. She was subsequently 
arrested for giving false personal information and for outstanding warrants. 
Despite the Defendants continued attempts to have Officer Olsen contact the registered 
owner of the vehicle, Officer Olsen refused to do so and decided to have the vehicle impounded. 
At that time the Defendant was told to step out of the vehicle. Officer Bailey asked for consent 
to search the person of the Defendant. Consent was given, and nothing was found on the 
Defendant. Officer Olsen then began an inventory search of the vehicle. At no time up to this 
point was the Defendant told he was under arrest. 
As the inventory search of the vehicle continued, Officer Olsen located in the back seat of 
the vehicle a black backpack. Officer Olsen opened the backpack and, in the front pocket, 
located a sunglass case, opened it, and noticed about ten small baggies, of which two contained a 
large amount of methamphetamine. Also in the backpack, Officer Olsen found syringes and 
other individual clear baggies. At this time the Defendant was advised he was under arrest, and 
Officer Olsen arrested the Defendant for possession of a controlled substance. After the arrest. 
Officer Olsen then continued to inventory the backpack and found an insurance application with 
the name of "Casey Weaver'" on it, a credit card receipt and a ticket out of Sunset Court with the 
name of "Casey Weaver." 
-2-
ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as Article 1 Section 
14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide in relevant part: "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated" The Courts on both the state and federal level have defined when a seizure is 
unreasonable. The Supreme Court in the case ofKatz v United States, 389 US 347 (1967) held: 
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes 
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 21A U. S. 
559. 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected. 
The general rule regarding warrantless searches was established in the case of Terry v 
Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) in which the Supreme Court set forth a three prong test in determining 
whether an individual is seized and what type of search is permitted under various types of 
seizures. In the case of State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002) the Utah Supreme Court 
defined once again its' long-standing position on permissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, the 
Court defined these levels as follows: 
A level-one citizen encounter with a lav* enforcement official is a consensual encounter 
wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning by an officer. Id± Since 
the encounter is consensual and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Royei\ 460 U.S. at 498-99. 
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is usually characterized as 
brief and non-intrusive. United States v Evans, 937 F,2d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); see 
also Werking. 915 F.2d at 1407 (noting a level two encounter is an investigative detention 
or "Terry stop"). Although it is a Fourth Amendment seizure, probable cause is not required. 
r\ f\ r\ 
Evans, 937 F.2d at 1537. Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and rational inferences 
.. . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime," an officer may 
initiate an investigative detention without consent. Werking. 915 F.2d at 1407. 
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been "characterized [as a] highly 
intrusive or lengthy detention [that] requires probable cause." Id A level three encounter is 
also a Fourth Amendment seizure. Id. 
Mere, Officer Olsen* s interactions with the Defendant clearly began with a level-two stop. 
The fact that Officer Olsen had the right to stop the vehicle based on his investigation, is what 
began the incident at a level-two stop. However, once it was determined the identity of the 
Defendant, that he did not own the vehicle, and that there was no active warrants for his arrest, he 
should have been free to leave. Instead. Officer Olsen forced the Defendant to sit outside the 
vehicle while he began to search. Once it was determined that the Defendant committed no 
crime, he should have been allowed to leave with his belongings. Officer Olsen cannot meet the 
level-two requirements of a reasonable articulable suspicion to search the contents of the 
backpack. 
Officer Olsen did not ask who the owner of the backpack was. He simply began to search 
the vehicle while making the Defendant wait. The Defendant was not asked if any items in the 
vehicle were his. or for his permission to search any articles in the vehicle. Officer Boots should 
have asked if the Defendant had any personal items in the vehicle prior to his search. It had 
already been made clear to Officer Olsen that the vehicle was not the Defendant's, and items in 
the vehicle may or may not have belonged to the Defendant. Moreover the Defendant was not 
put under arrest, so any argument that the search of the backpack was incident to arrest must fail. 
A case analogous to this case is the case of State v. Bissegger, 76 P.3d 178 (Utah Ct. App. 
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2003). In Bisseggei\ the Court of Appeals held that car passengers have a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in their belongings left in a vehicle. Bissegger. 76 P.3d at 182. In Bissegger, the 
defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped based on the vehicle she was in having 
an expired registration. During the conversation with the driver, the officer asked the driver to 
exit the vehicle due to his belief the driver was impaired with alcohol. The officer then asked the 
driver for consent to search the vehicle, which was given, then asked the passenger, Bissegger, to 
exit the vehicle. Bissegger left behind some of her belongings, including a small lip-balm 
container. During the search the officer searched the lip-balm container and found 
methamphetamine inside the container. Bissegger moved to suppress the evidence. 
The Bissegger court concluded that the defendant and a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in her lip-balm container left in the car, and found that a lip-balm container analogous to a 
shopping bag, shoulder bag, jacket or purse, as each is an item is a closed container. Bissegger, 
76 P.3d at 182. And as such, had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. Id. The same 
analysis also applies to this matter. The vehicle was not the Defendant's vehicle. He had been 
loaned the vehicle by its owner and knew not of the registration/insurance status of the vehicle. 
The Defendant in this matter would likewise have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. 
The Bissegger court also concluded that the defendant never relinquished a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the container after being ordered out of the vehicle. Id. at 183. The 
same reasoning can be applied to this matter. The Defendant was ordered out of the vehicle, 
made to wait while the vehicle was searched, and was only put under arrest once the search of the 
Defendant's backpack was completed. The Defendant has a reasonable, legitimate expectation of 
privacy in his backpack. 
• o -
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument. Defendant, Casey Weaver, respectfully requests that this 
Court suppress the evidence found during the search of the vehicle. 
DATED this 8th day of May. 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of May, 2006,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Motion to Suppress to: 
Weber County Attorney 





Camillc L. Neider; No, 7266 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd., Suite 230 
Qgden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 801-399-8377 
Fax: 801-399-8304 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAFI, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CASEY CRAIG WEAVER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE 
STATE'S ANSWER TO THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE 
CASE NO. 051904357 
JUDGE PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
The State of Utah, represented by Camille L. Neider. Deputy Weber County Attorney. 
objects to Defendant's Motion to Suppress* The drugs and paraphernalia in Defendant's 
backpack were discovered pursuant to a valid inventory search and would have inevitably been 
discovered after the arrest of Defendant's passenger. The State requests Defendant's motion be 
denied. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the morning of September 3, 2005, at approximately 3:10 A.M.9 Sgt Trent Olson, 
South Ogden Police Department, initiated a traffic stop of a white Nissan driven by Defendant, 
Sgt. Olaen stopped the car after checking the license plate and discovering that the vehicle had a 
revoked registration and was uninsured. Sgt. Olsen requested Defendant's driver's license, 
X 
registration and proof of insurance. Defendant had a valid driver's license but did not have any 
registration or insurance information and did not own the vehicle. 
Shortly after the traffic stop, another officer, Officer Bailey, arrived on the scene to assist. 
Officer Bailey made contact with the passenger to see if she was the registered owner, Tammy 
CasseL The passenger gave a name that turned out to be false, 
Since the vehicle was unregistered and uninsured, it was impounded and the contents 
inventoried by the officers. As the vehicle was searched, a woman's purse containing 
paraphernalia was located under the passenger's seat. The female was then arrested for 
possession of paraphernalia by Sgt Olsen before he continued to search the interior of the car. 
After returning to the car, Sgt, Olsen found a black backpack in the back seat. Inside the 
backpack were drugs, drug paraphernalia and documents with Defendant's name on them. 
Defendant was then arrested. 
II, ARGUMENT 
A. Defendant's Backpack Was Located and Searched Pursuant to a Legal Vehicle 
Inventory Search-
The Fourth Amendment provides for "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." 
This amendment has been interpreted to apply "whenever an individual may loarbor a reasonable 
'expectation of privacy.,n Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S.I9 9 (quoting Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). It also generally requires that a search be conducted 
pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause. Exceptions exist, however, for several types of 
searches. ".Hie State bears the burden of showing that the circumstances of the seizure constitute 
2 
an exception to the warrant requirement Chime] v, California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969): State v, 
Christensem 676 P,2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). 
Inventory searches are a well recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment See Statev.Hveh. 711 P.2d 264,267-68 (Utah 1985) (citing South Dalcota 
v. Opperman, 428 US. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092,49 L. Ed, 2d 1000 (1976)). The purpose of an 
inventory search is to "(I) protect individual property in police custody; (2) protect police against 
claims of loss or theft of property; and (3) detect dangerous conditions or instrumentalities within 
impounded vehicles." State v. Shamhlin, 763 P.2d 425> 426 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "In order to 
support a finding that a valid inventory search has taken place, the court must first determine 
whether there was reasonable and proper justification for the impoundment of the vehicle,'1 
Hyglx 711 P,2d at 268. The State must also show" that there exists an established reasonable 
procedure for safeguarding impounded vehicles and their contents and that the challenged police 
activity was essentially in conformance with that procedure.'" Id, at 269 (quoting 2 Wayne H. 
LaFave, Search & Seizure §§ 7.4 at 576-77 (1978)). 
The Court must first determine whether Sgt Olsen possessed "reasonable and proper 
justification" to impound the vehicle "either through explicit statutory authorization or by the 
circumstances surrounding the initial stop." Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268. Sgt. Olsen was authorized 
pursuant to UC.A. 41-la-l 101(1 )(l)(iii) to impound the vehicle, It provides that "...Any peace 
officer, without a warrant, may seize and take possession of any vehicle...that is being operated 
on a highway.. .with registration that is suspended or revoked." Clearly, Sgt Olsen was 
authorized to impound the vehicle. 
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The Court must also determine if the impoundment of this vehicle was done pursuant to a 
standardized departmental policy. "Inventories should not be upheld... unless the government 
shows that there exists an established reasonable procedure for safeguarding impounded vehicles 
and their contents and that the challenged police activity was essentially in conformance writh that 
procedure." Hygh, 711 P.2d at 269, According to South Ogden PD. Impound Policy, there are 
standardized procedures for impounding and inventorying a vehicle, See Attached Exhibit A, 
Sgt. Olsen's impound conforms with those procedures and there has been no argument from the 
Defendant that they do not. 
B* It Was Inevitable That the Drugs Would Be Found Pursuant to a Search 
Incident to Arrest of the Passenger after She Gave a False Name to the 
Officers. 
The Court can also deny Defendant's motion on the alternative grounds that the drugs in 
defendant's backpack would have been inevitably discovered. The inevitable discovery 
exception applies "whenever an independent investigation inevitably would have led to discovery 
of the evidence, whether or not the investigation was ongoing at the time of the illegal police 
conduct.0 United States v Larscn. 127 F.3d 984, 986 (1Q* Cir. 1997). In addition, "(t]he 
inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule, and provides that evidence 
need not be suppressed 'if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence thai 
the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,71' State ex 
rel. M.V., 977 P.2d 494? 496-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 
(1984)). 
Prior to any search of the vehicle, Defendant's passenger April Heun first told Officer 
Bailey her name was Jacqueline Heun and a date of birth of 6/13/1987. Sgt. Olsen was 
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suspicious because she did not match the physical description on Jacqueline Heun's license and 
he knew there was another female with the last name of Heun with an outstanding warrant. April 
gave the name Kathleen Heun when questioned again. During the initial phases of the stop, 
April twice committed the offense of giving false information to a peace officer. At the time Sgt. 
Olsen and the other officers began the impound of Defendant's vehicle, they had not completely 
sorted-out April's true identity. It is clear, however, that the officers did not believe that she was 
Jacqueline or Kathleen and would have pursued her true identity. 
Once she was arrested for false information, the officers would have searched the vehicle 
incident to her arrest. New York y. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 0981V ntWhen a policeman has made 
a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile;, he may, as a contemporaneous 
incident of thai airest, search the passenger compartment of thai automobile' including 'the 
contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment.M 3 W. Lafave. Search and 
Seizure 436 (3d ed. 1996)(quotiug BeltonV Belton applies not only to the driver, but also when a 
passenger is arrested See United States v, Ortiz. 63 F.3d 952, 954 (10th Cir, 1995). 
Additionallyj Belton would apply even though the passenger was removed from the vehicle when 
the search occurs. See United States y. Lacey. 86 F,3d 956, 971 (10th Cir. 1996). 
C Defendant Has Provided No Other Legitimate Basis upon Which the Court 
Could Suppress the Drugs Found in His Backpack. 
Defendant argues several other positions which are all factually or legally incorrect. 
First, Defendant argues that he should have been allowed to claim his personal items from the car 
and leave the scene prior to the drugs being discovered. Defendant has provided no authority 
.supporting his position that a driver can leave the scene prior to completion of the traffic stop and 
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investigation. Defendant's statement that "once it was determined that the Defendant committed 
no crime, he should have been allowed to leave with his belongings" (Def. Memo at 4) is clearly 
wrong, Defendant, at a minimum, would have been cited for no proof of insurance and revoked 
registration, Also, Defendant would have been required to stay until the impound was completed 
in order for officers to give him, as the vehicle operator, a copy of the impound form. See 
SOPD Impound Policy. 
The rest of Defendant's motion to suppress relies on State v. Bissegger, 16 P.3d 178 
(Utah App. 2003). Bisseqger has no application to Defendant's situation. Bisseqger was clearly 
focused on the passenger and whether they could be questioned, detained and their personal 
items searched during a traffic stop. Defendant was the driver in this situation and Bissegger is 
not relevant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
be denied. 
$h Dated this \t* N day of June, 2006. 
CanlillefL. Neider 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress was mailed/faxed on this day of June, 2006, to the following: 
Ryan J. Bushell 
Attorney for Defendant 
2562 Washington Blvd. 






To provide officers with information and guidance on towing vehicles, 
inventory, storage, and releasing impounded vehicles. 
II. POLICY 
South Ogden Police Department must follow established guidelines to 
tow, inventory and release all vehicles. 
IE. PROCEDURE 
A. Determining When to Tow 
Officers of tire South Ogden Police Department may authorize the towing 
of vehicles when one or more of the following conditions exist. 
1. When an accident occurs on a public roadway, or public vehicular area, 
that renders as veliicle disabled, and the owner or operator is not available 
or, in the officer's judgment, is not capable of making a rational decision 
regarding the disposition of the vehicle. 
2. When it is a stolen vehicle, and the owner or a responsible party is 
not readily available to take possession. 
3. When the operator of the vehicle has been arrested, and no 
responsible person is readily available to take custody of the vehicle, 
a.) If the owner/operator is under arrest and decides to turn the vehicle 
over to another person, the arresting officer must confirm that the 
person taking control of the veliicle has a valid operator's license and 
is not under the influence of an impairing substance. 
4. Officers may authorize the towing of a disabled veliicle that is creating 
a hazard or obstructing traffic, When possible, officers should attempt 
to contact tire registered owner of the vehicle prior to towing, 
5, When an officer believes it is necessary to tow a vehicle, in 
circumstances other than those in III.A, the officer will notify the 
supervisor and obtain approval to tow the vehicle, 
C, Private Premises 
When an on-duty officer is requested hy a citizen to remove a vehicle from private 
property, the officer will explain to the citizen that he or she may have the vehicle 
towed without the assistance of the police. Officers who are on-duty or employed to 
perform secondary law enforcement will not request tows of unauthorized vehicles 
parked on private property. 
D. Rotation Wreckers 
1. When an officer requires a wrecker to remove a motor vehicle (other than a city-
owned vehicle), the officer will request a "rotation wrecker", unless the 
owner/operator requests a specific wrecker service or a wrecker company is under 
contract with the City 
2. Wreckers will tow and store vehicles on their company lots. Vehicles 
which are evidence or contain evidence of a serious crime may be towed to the 
Police Depaitment Sally Port or City Shop Bay for processing, this should be done 
at the directions of the on-duty Supervisor and the investigator in charge of the 
investigation. Once the Crime Scene personnel and investigating officers have 
completed processing the vehicle, the vehicle will be removed from the Police 
Department or City Shop, The assigned investigating officer is responsible for 
making the necessary arrangements for the vehicle's removal The vehicle may be 
towed to a wrecker yard or released to the owner. Lots should be sanctioned as 
'state Impound Lots". 
3. Inventory procedures serve to protect an owner1? property while it is in the 
custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized 
property and to guard the police and public from danger. An officer must 
complete a Vehicle Inventory Form each time a vehicle is towed at fee direction 
of the South Ogden Police Department, 
a. Any officer having a vehicle towed will conduct an inventory of the 
interior and trunk areas in order to record all property in the vehicle. 
b, Locked, sealed or closed containers such as suitcases, packages or boxes will be 
opened when the contents cannot be determined from an examination of the 
container's exterior. However, locked or sealed items will not be forcibly 
opened in order to inventory the contents if doing so will cause damage to the 
container or value of tire contents. These types of items will be place in 
evidence> following police department protocol, and a chain of custody 
established to protect the items. If probable cause exists, a search warrant will 
be obtained to examine contents. The vehicle's trunk and/or glove compartment 
will not be forcibly opened in order to inventory the contents of these areas. 
4, Vehicle Inventory Form 
In all cases in which a Vehicle Inventory Form is required, the following 
procedure should be followed: 
a. Whenever possible, a witness to the inventory of the vehicle should sign the 
Vehicle Inventory Form. 
b. The owner/operator will be given a copy of the State Impound form, if 
applicable, 
c. The officer will submit the inventory form and other applicable documents to 
the Records Division 
F. "Holding Vehicles 
1, An officer may place a "Hold" on a vehicle in one of the following situations and 
with a supervisor's approval 
a The vehicle is being held to be searched without a search warrant or 
pending the execution of a search warrant 
b. The vehicle and/or items contained in or on the vehicle are needed for 
evidence. 
c. The vehicle has been seized for forfeiture as specifically provided by law. 
d. Other justified reason, approved by the supervisor, 
2. To place a hold on a vehicle that has been towed, an officer must obtain their 
supervisor's approval and provide the following information in the 
"Remarks" section of the Inventory Form 
a. The word "POLICE HOLD" in bold lettering. 
b. The reason for the hold. 
c. The name of the authorizing supervisor. 
3. Hie wrecker services have been ask not to release these vehicle without first 
obtaining permission from the impounding officer, The impounding officer is 
responsible to check on a vehicle that they have place a "HOLD" on and 
resolve the reason for the hold as soon as possible, to avoid unnecessary 
storage fees. 
G. Release of Towed Vehicles 
1. Each individual rotation wrecker company is responsible for the storage and 
release of towed vehicles in their possession. The rotation wrecker companies 
should not release towed vehicles (and items which are in the vehicle) except 
upon presentation of proof of ownership by the claimant. 
2. Rotation wrecker companies will not release any vehicle if a "POLICE HOLD" 
was requested until the release has been authorized by the officer who ordered 
the tow. 
3. An officer will advise the owner/operator of any vehicle towed to go directly to 
the wrecker company to obtain their vehicle. If a "Hold,r has been placed on the 
vehicle, then the officer will advise the owner/operator that he/she will be 
contacted when release of the vehicle has been authorized. An officer placing a 
hold on a vehicle will conduct a follow-up investigation concerning the status of a 
vehicle with a "Hold" every two days. When the officer determines the "Hold" is 
no longer necessary, the officer will advise the owner/operator and the wrecker 
company that the vehicle may be released, 
H. Abandoned Vehicles 
1, A vehicle suspected of being abandoned will be towed by order of the officer who 
discovers the veliicle if it is interfering with, or obstructing traffic. The officer 
will enter "Traffic Hazard" on the applicable forms. 
2, When an officer observes an unattended vehicle inside the city limits of South 
Ogden that is suspected of being abandoned, but not interfering with or 
obstructing traffic, the officer will: 
a. Issue a "Courtesy Citation Tag" indicating the violation. 
b. The officer should check back on the vehicle after an appropriate time 
period has passed and take appropriate action at that time. Personal contact 
with the owner should always be attempted prior to impoundment. 
J, Additional Towing Procedures and Responsibilities 
1, Duties of an Officer Ordering a Tow 
a. The officer will complete the Inventory Report and/or State Impound Form as 
thoroughly and completely as possible. Officers must enter the color of the 
vehicle along with the make, VIN* and vehicle registration, including state of 
registration. All paperwork dealing with the impound (with the exception of 
the driver's/owner's copies) will be forwarded to the Records Division for 
processing. 
b. A reasonable attempt should always be made to contact the registered owner 
of an impounded vehicle. (Is the vehicle stolen or missing? Has it been sold 
to another part} etc.) 
c. If the officer is successful in contacting the registered owner by telephone, the 
officer should give the owner the following information and, within reasonable 
limits, answer the owner's questions regarding the vehicle and the towing, 
• A description of the vehicle, 
• The place where die vehicle is stored, 
• The reason for the tow. 
• The violation with which the owner is charged, if any. 
d. A vehicle recovered as evidence because it is used during the commission of a 
crime, contains evidence of a crime, or is a recovered stolen vehicle may be held 
for a reasonable processing period, The initial investigating officer will 
document their actions and any relevant information in the police report. 
